nxdns/src/web/server.zig

//! The admin HTTP listener.
//!
//! One `std.http.Server` per connection over the shared `listener.Core` accept
//! loop (milestone-18 ruling 1): a listener task in the app's group, an inner
//! `Io.Group` of connection tasks, and a keep-alive loop per connection that
//! ends on `error.HttpConnectionClosing`. The shape is
//! lib/std/Build/WebServer.zig:152-185; the slot pool and the shutdown split
//! come from the core, which documents both.
//!
//! Connection slots are fixed and pre-allocated, and each one owns every buffer
//! a request needs, so serving allocates only what a handler asks the
//! per-request arena for. Over capacity the listener answers 503 and closes
//! (ruling 7) rather than queueing: refusing is honest, a queue would hide it.
//!
//! There is no per-request timeout this milestone. The port is LAN-facing and
//! behind the operator's own network; the cancel path, not a timer, is what
//! bounds shutdown. A slow client costs one of 64 slots and nothing else.

const std = @import("std");
const net = std.Io.net;
const http = std.http;
const Allocator = std.mem.Allocator;

const address = @import("../platform/address.zig");
const api_limiter = @import("api_limiter.zig");
const auth = @import("auth.zig");
const cert_store = @import("../server/cert_store.zig");
const client_names = @import("../server/client_names.zig");
const clients = @import("../server/clients.zig");
const db = @import("../storage/db.zig");
const disk_monitor = @import("../storage/disk_monitor.zig");
const dns_handler = @import("../server/handler.zig");
const doh_server = @import("../server/doh_server.zig");
const dot_server = @import("../server/dot_server.zig");
const http_util = @import("http_util.zig");
const listener_core = @import("../server/listener.zig");
const local_tables_mod = @import("../server/local_tables.zig");
const logger_mod = @import("../storage/logger.zig");
const manager_mod = @import("../filter/manager.zig");
const model = @import("../config/model.zig");
const pause_mod = @import("../server/pause.zig");
const history_mod = @import("../upstream/history.zig");
const pool_mod = @import("../upstream/pool.zig");
const query_sink = @import("../server/query_sink.zig");
const retention_mod = @import("../storage/retention.zig");
const router = @import("router.zig");
const sse = @import("sse.zig");
const tcp_server = @import("../server/tcp_server.zig");
const udp_server = @import("../server/udp_server.zig");

const log = std.log.scoped(.web_server);

/// Ruling 7. The receive buffer is also the maximum request head
/// (http/Server.zig:32 sets `max_head_len` from it).
const recv_buffer_len = 8 * 1024;
const send_buffer_len = 4 * 1024;

/// Ruling 7. 64 slots at ~16 KiB each is ~1 MiB of fixed connection state.
pub const default_max_connections: u16 = 64;

/// How much per-request arena a connection keeps between requests. Enough that
/// a normal API response allocates nothing new, small enough that 64 idle
/// connections cost 4 MiB rather than 64.
const arena_retain_bytes = 64 * 1024;

const over_capacity_body = "{\"error\":\"too many connections\"}";
const over_capacity_response = std.fmt.comptimePrint(
    "HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable\r\n" ++
        "content-type: " ++ http_util.content_type_json ++ "\r\n" ++
        "connection: close\r\n" ++
        "content-length: {d}\r\n\r\n{s}",
    .{ over_capacity_body.len, over_capacity_body },
);

/// The verdict of an API rate-limit check. The limiter's own result type, not a
/// copy of it: two structurally identical verdicts would only drift.
pub const LimitVerdict = api_limiter.Result;

pub const AuthCheckFn = *const fn (
    state: *WebState,
    io: std.Io,
    request: *const http_util.Request,
) bool;

pub const LimitCheckFn = *const fn (
    state: *WebState,
    io: std.Io,
    request: *const http_util.Request,
) LimitVerdict;

/// Applies a configuration change to the running server (ruling 12: rules,
/// blocklists, groups, clients and prefixes take effect live). Mutation
/// handlers call it through this pointer so their tests can count the calls
/// without a real `Manager`.
pub const ReloadFn = *const fn (state: *WebState, io: std.Io) anyerror!void;

/// Everything the web layer borrows, assembled by the composition root. Every
/// pointer here outlives the listener task: `app.serve` declares the
/// collaborators above the task group and cancels the group before releasing
/// any of them.
///
/// The collaborator pointers are optional because the web layer must build and
/// be testable without a whole running server, and because `web.enabled =
/// false` means several of them are never opened at all (ruling 6). A handler
/// that finds the collaborator it needs missing answers 503, the same way it
/// answers a missing snapshot.
/// Which of the two sources governs this process's configuration (milestone-20
/// ruling 1). Per-process state, never persisted: authority lives in the
/// invocation, and the database carries no record of who wrote it.
///
/// The `managed_file` path is owned by `serve`'s arena, which outlives every
/// `WebState`, so nothing here copies it.
pub const Authority = union(enum) {
    database,
    managed_file: []const u8,
};

pub const WebState = struct {
    gpa: Allocator,
    web: model.Web = .{},

    /// Defaults to `.database`: a `WebState` nobody told about a managed file
    /// governs nothing declaratively, which is the safe reading — the mutation
    /// routes stay live rather than a half-wired server refusing every write.
    authority: Authority = .database,
    /// When this process loaded the managed file, in epoch seconds. Null in
    /// database mode, which never reconciles. It answers exactly "this process
    /// loaded the file at T" and nothing more: a file whose mtime is newer has
    /// not been loaded by the running process.
    reconciled_at: ?i64 = null,

    handler: ?*dns_handler.Handler = null,
    pause: ?*pause_mod.Pause = null,
    tracker: ?*clients.Tracker = null,
    /// The learned-name resolver, for `metrics.collect` (milestone-25 ruling 9).
    client_names: ?*client_names.Resolver = null,
    manager: ?*manager_mod.Manager = null,
    pool: ?*pool_mod.Pool = null,
    /// The upstream-outcome accumulator, for `metrics.collect` and the
    /// `/api/health` rollup (m26 ruling 7). The ranged endpoint reads the
    /// flushed rows through `querylog_db`, not through this.
    history: ?*history_mod.Accumulator = null,
    monitor: ?*disk_monitor.Monitor = null,
    /// The local records and forward zones the DNS path reads. The
    /// local-records and forward-zones handlers rebuild and swap them
    /// (ruling 12).
    local_tables: ?*local_tables_mod.LocalTables = null,
    logger: ?*logger_mod.Logger = null,
    retention: ?*retention_mod.Retention = null,
    sessions: ?*auth.Sessions = null,
    /// The password hash every auth decision reads. `web` above is the boot
    /// configuration and goes stale the moment `PUT /api/settings` changes the
    /// password; this holder is what makes the revoked credential stop working
    /// without a restart. The composition root seeds it from the boot hash,
    /// the settings handler installs replacements, and whoever owns the
    /// `WebState` calls `live_hash.deinit`.
    live_hash: auth.LiveHash = .{},
    limiter: ?*api_limiter.ApiLimiter = null,
    /// The SSE fanout. The sink publishes into it on the DNS hot path; the
    /// live-query handler subscribes.
    hub: ?*sse.Hub = null,
    sink: ?*query_sink.QuerySink = null,
    /// The DoH/DoT certificate stores; null while an endpoint is disabled.
    /// `POST /api/certs/reload` reloads through these, and `/metrics` reads
    /// their counters (milestone-10 rulings 8 and 10).
    doh_certs: ?*cert_store.CertStore = null,
    dot_certs: ?*cert_store.CertStore = null,
    /// The DoH/DoT listeners themselves; null while an endpoint is disabled
    /// or its bind failed. `/metrics` reads their connection counters
    /// (milestone-10 ruling 10).
    doh_listener: ?*doh_server.DohServer = null,
    dot_listener: ?*dot_server.DotServer = null,
    /// The plain DNS listeners. The app binds one per family per protocol, so
    /// `/metrics` sums each family across its slice (milestone-16 ruling 13).
    udp_listeners: []const *udp_server.UdpServer = &.{},
    tcp_listeners: []const *tcp_server.TcpServer = &.{},

    /// The web task's own connections (m7 ruling 21) — never the DNS path's.
    config_db: ?*db.Db = null,
    /// Serializes the mutation handlers' work on `config_db`. Connection tasks
    /// share the one connection, and `changes()` and `lastInsertRowid()` are
    /// connection state that the repositories read after a write, so two
    /// concurrent writes would misread each other's row counts.
    config_lock: std.Io.Mutex = .init,
    querylog_db: ?*db.Db = null,

    version: []const u8 = "",
    /// The `--admin-dev` asset directory, read by the dev-mode fallback. Empty
    /// whenever that fallback is not wired.
    dev_dir: []const u8 = "",
    /// Unix seconds at process start, for uptime.
    started_unix: i64 = 0,

    /// The table `dispatch` matches against. Defaults to the shipped one;
    /// tests point it at their own.
    routes: []const router.RouteInfo = router.routes,

    /// Answers a path no route claimed and that is not under `/api` — the
    /// static assets and the SPA fallback (ruling 24). Null means every miss is
    /// a JSON 404.
    fallback: ?router.HandlerFn = null,

    /// The three policy seams. They are function pointers so that the tests in
    /// this layer can drive authentication, rate limiting and reload with
    /// doubles instead of a real session store, a real clock and a real
    /// `Manager`. The defaults are the production implementations, so the
    /// composition root wires collaborators rather than behaviour, and a
    /// forgotten wire fails closed rather than open. This is the only
    /// indirection of its kind in the web layer; everything else is a direct
    /// call.
    check_auth: AuthCheckFn = sessionAuth,
    check_limit: LimitCheckFn = bucketLimit,
    reload_fn: ?ReloadFn = null,
};

/// Ruling 17. Authentication is enabled iff a password hash is set — the live
/// one, so a password set through the API locks the routes without a restart.
/// With it set but no session store wired, every session route is refused: the
/// failure mode of a half-wired server must be locked, not open.
pub fn sessionAuth(state: *WebState, io: std.Io, request: *const http_util.Request) bool {
    if (!state.live_hash.enabled(io)) return true;
    const sessions = state.sessions orelse return false;
    const cookie = http_util.cookieValue(request.cookie, auth.cookie_name) orelse return false;
    return sessions.validate(io, cookie);
}

/// Ruling 19. No limiter wired means no limit: the limiter is a defence the
/// operator configures, and its absence must not refuse traffic.
///
/// Keyed on `client_addr`, not on the socket peer: behind a trusted proxy every
/// peer is the proxy, and one bucket for every remote user is no limiter at all.
pub fn bucketLimit(state: *WebState, io: std.Io, request: *const http_util.Request) LimitVerdict {
    const limiter = state.limiter orelse return .ok;
    const now = std.Io.Clock.awake.now(io);
    return limiter.check(io, now, address.NetAddress.fromIp(request.client_addr));
}

/// Seam double: refuses nothing. For tests and for a server with no admin
/// password, where `sessionAuth` already answers the same way.
pub fn allowAll(state: *WebState, io: std.Io, request: *const http_util.Request) bool {
    _ = state;
    _ = io;
    _ = request;
    return true;
}

/// Seam double: throttles nothing.
pub fn neverLimit(state: *WebState, io: std.Io, request: *const http_util.Request) LimitVerdict {
    _ = state;
    _ = io;
    _ = request;
    return .ok;
}

/// What the admin listener counts on top of `listener.CoreStats`. Nothing
/// exports these: there is no `nxdns_web_*` family, they exist for the
/// integration tests and for a future one.
pub const Stats = struct {
    requests: std.atomic.Value(u64) = .init(0),
};

pub const Options = struct {
    max_connections: u16 = default_max_connections,
};

pub const Server = struct {
    core: listener_core.Core(Config),
    state: *WebState,
    stats: Stats,

    /// One slot's fixed cost. The head copies exist because every string in
    /// `request.head` dies on the first body read (http/Server.zig:594). The
    /// receive and send buffers belong to the core.
    pub const Payload = struct {
        target_buf: [http_util.max_target_len]u8,
        cookie_buf: [http_util.max_cookie_len]u8,
        accept_encoding_buf: [http_util.max_header_value_len]u8,
        if_none_match_buf: [http_util.max_header_value_len]u8,
        xff_buf: [http_util.max_xff_len]u8,
        /// Per-request working memory, reset between requests on the same
        /// connection so a keep-alive client cannot grow it without bound.
        arena: std.heap.ArenaAllocator,

        fn init(payload: *Payload, gpa: Allocator) void {
            payload.arena = .init(gpa);
        }

        fn deinit(payload: *Payload) void {
            payload.arena.deinit();
        }
    };

    const Config = struct {
        pub const Owner = Server;
        pub const ConnPayload = Payload;
        pub const serveConn = serveOne;
        pub const read_buffer_len = recv_buffer_len;
        pub const write_buffer_len = send_buffer_len;
        pub const log = std.log.scoped(.web_server);
        pub const name = "web";
        pub const refuse = refuseOverCapacity;
        pub const initPayload = Payload.init;
        pub const deinitPayload = Payload.deinit;
    };

    pub const Conn = listener_core.Core(Config).Conn;
    pub const ListenError = listener_core.Core(Config).ListenError;

    pub fn listen(
        gpa: Allocator,
        io: std.Io,
        listen_address: net.IpAddress,
        state: *WebState,
        options: Options,
    ) ListenError!Server {
        return .{
            .core = try listener_core.Core(Config).listen(gpa, io, listen_address, options.max_connections),
            .state = state,
            .stats = .{},
        };
    }

    /// The kernel-assigned address. A port of 0 in `listen` resolves here.
    pub fn boundAddress(self: *const Server) net.IpAddress {
        return self.core.boundAddress();
    }

    /// Accept loop. Returns when the task is canceled or `deinit` stops it.
    pub fn serve(self: *Server, io: std.Io) void {
        self.core.serve(io);
    }

    pub fn deinit(self: *Server, io: std.Io) void {
        // Ruling 11 of milestone 16, before the core shuts the connections
        // down: a live-query task parked in `Hub.wait` is waiting on an event,
        // not on its socket, so shutting the connection down does not reach it.
        // Without this the drain waits out one heartbeat interval per idle
        // stream.
        if (self.state.hub) |hub| hub.close(io);

        self.core.deinit(io);
        self.* = undefined;
    }

    /// Ruling 7: over capacity the client is told so, never silently dropped.
    ///
    /// The response is written from the accept loop, because refusing must not
    /// consume the slot that is missing. It is ~130 bytes — one socket buffer —
    /// so a peer that never reads still cannot stall the loop.
    ///
    /// The close that follows does not drain the client's request first, so
    /// Linux may follow the response with an RST and a client that had already
    /// sent its request can lose the 503 and see a reset instead. Draining
    /// would mean a blocking read on the accept loop with no bound but the
    /// client's goodwill, which is a worse failure than a lost error page on a
    /// server that is already at capacity.
    fn refuseOverCapacity(io: std.Io, stream: net.Stream) void {
        var buf: [over_capacity_response.len]u8 = undefined;
        var writer = stream.writer(io, &buf);
        writer.interface.writeAll(over_capacity_response) catch {};
        writer.interface.flush() catch {};
        stream.close(io);
    }

    /// One connection's keep-alive loop. The core closes the slot when this
    /// returns.
    fn serveOne(self: *Server, io: std.Io, index: usize) void {
        const conn = &self.core.conns[index];
        var reader = conn.stream.reader(io, &conn.read_buf);
        var writer = conn.stream.writer(io, &conn.write_buf);
        var connection: http.Server = .init(&reader.interface, &writer.interface);

        while (connection.reader.state == .ready) {
            var request = connection.receiveHead() catch |err| switch (err) {
                // The normal end of a keep-alive connection.
                error.HttpConnectionClosing => return,
                // Cancellation and a vanished client both land here; neither is
                // worth a counter.
                error.ReadFailed => return,
                error.HttpHeadersOversize => {
                    listener_core.bump(&self.core.stats.connection_errors);
                    return;
                },
                error.HttpRequestTruncated, error.HttpHeadersInvalid => {
                    listener_core.bump(&self.core.stats.connection_errors);
                    return;
                },
            };

            // RFC 9110 §8.6: a request with neither content-length nor
            // transfer-encoding has an empty body, but std leaves the head
            // saying "unknown" and `discardBody` asserts on it inside every
            // `respond` (http/Server.zig:631) — `curl -X POST` panics the
            // process. A zero length is what the head means, and it satisfies
            // every downstream reader: `bodyReader` (http.zig:445) goes
            // straight to `.ready` on a zero content-length.
            if (request.head.method.requestHasBody() and
                request.head.transfer_encoding == .none and
                request.head.content_length == null)
            {
                request.head.content_length = 0;
            }

            listener_core.bump(&self.stats.requests);
            // Retained with a limit, not wholesale: a single 1 MiB body would
            // otherwise keep a megabyte per slot alive for as long as the
            // browser holds the connection.
            _ = conn.payload.arena.reset(.{ .retain_with_limit = arena_retain_bytes });

            self.handleRequest(io, conn, &request) catch |err| switch (err) {
                // Ruling 28: the peer went away mid-response. Normal.
                error.WriteFailed => return,
                error.HttpExpectationFailed, error.OutOfMemory => {
                    listener_core.bump(&self.core.stats.connection_errors);
                    return;
                },
            };
        }
    }

    /// Builds the request view and dispatches it. Every string a handler may
    /// touch after a body read is copied here first (ruling 25).
    fn handleRequest(
        self: *Server,
        io: std.Io,
        conn: *Conn,
        request: *http.Server.Request,
    ) http_util.HandlerError!void {
        const arena = conn.payload.arena.allocator();

        const target = request.head.target;
        if (target.len > conn.payload.target_buf.len) {
            var view = bareRequest(request, conn, arena);
            return http_util.respondError(&view, .uri_too_long, "target too long");
        }
        @memcpy(conn.payload.target_buf[0..target.len], target);
        const copied = conn.payload.target_buf[0..target.len];

        const split = std.mem.findScalar(u8, copied, '?') orelse copied.len;
        const raw_path = copied[0..split];
        const query = if (split == copied.len) copied[split..] else copied[split + 1 ..];

        const cookie = copyCookie(request, &conn.payload.cookie_buf);
        const accept_encoding = copyHeader(request, "accept-encoding", &conn.payload.accept_encoding_buf);
        const if_none_match = copyHeader(request, "if-none-match", &conn.payload.if_none_match_buf);

        const peer = address.NetAddress.fromIp(conn.peer);
        const forwarded_for = copyHeaderSuffix(request, "x-forwarded-for", &conn.payload.xff_buf);
        const client_addr = switch (clientAddr(self.state.web.trusted_proxies, peer, forwarded_for)) {
            .addr => |addr| addr,
            .bad_forwarded_for => {
                var view = bareRequest(request, conn, arena);
                return http_util.respondError(&view, .bad_request, "malformed x-forwarded-for");
            },
        };
        // A forwarded entry has no port of its own; the peer keeps the one it
        // connected from.
        const client_ip = if (client_addr.eql(peer)) conn.peer else client_addr.toIp(0);

        // Decoding is destructive, so it runs on a copy: W8's asset lookup needs
        // the raw path to match embedded file names byte for byte.
        const decodable = arena.dupe(u8, raw_path) catch return error.OutOfMemory;
        const path = http_util.parsePath(decodable) catch {
            var view = bareRequest(request, conn, arena);
            return http_util.respondError(&view, .bad_request, "malformed path");
        };

        var view: http_util.Request = .{
            .http = request,
            .method = request.head.method,
            .path = path,
            .raw_path = raw_path,
            .query = query,
            .id = null,
            .cookie = cookie,
            .accept_encoding = accept_encoding,
            .if_none_match = if_none_match,
            .peer = conn.peer,
            .client_addr = client_ip,
            .arena = arena,
        };
        return router.dispatch(self.state, io, &view);
    }

    /// A request view for the errors that are decided before parsing finishes.
    fn bareRequest(request: *http.Server.Request, conn: *Conn, arena: Allocator) http_util.Request {
        return .{
            .http = request,
            .method = request.head.method,
            .path = .empty,
            .raw_path = "",
            .query = "",
            .id = null,
            .cookie = "",
            .accept_encoding = "",
            .if_none_match = "",
            .peer = conn.peer,
            // These responses are decided before the forwarded-for header is
            // read, or because reading it failed; the socket peer is all that
            // is known.
            .client_addr = conn.peer,
            .arena = arena,
        };
    }
};

/// Copies one header value into `buf`. A value too long for its budget reads as
/// absent: the headers this applies to are an `accept-encoding` and an
/// `if-none-match`, and losing either degrades to uncompressed and
/// unconditional — never to a wrong answer. The cookie header has its own
/// copier, because losing it costs the session (ruling 7 of milestone 16).
fn copyHeader(request: *http.Server.Request, name: []const u8, buf: []u8) []const u8 {
    const value = headerValue(request, name) orelse return "";
    if (value.len > buf.len) return "";
    @memcpy(buf[0..value.len], value);
    return buf[0..value.len];
}

/// Copies the **last** `buf.len` bytes of one header value into `buf`. Null
/// means the header is absent, which is a different answer from an empty value.
///
/// The tail is what matters for `x-forwarded-for`, and `copyHeader`'s
/// empty-on-overflow rule would be a security hole here: an empty value reads as
/// "no header", the effective client falls back to the socket peer, and behind
/// the same-box proxy this feature exists for that peer is loopback — which
/// `web.api_localhost_exempt` exempts from the API limiter by default. A client
/// would regain the exemption by sending an oversized header. Keeping the tail
/// closes that: the proxy appends its entry last, so the entry that names the
/// real client is always in the final bytes.
fn copyHeaderSuffix(request: *http.Server.Request, name: []const u8, buf: []u8) ?[]const u8 {
    const value = headerValue(request, name) orelse return null;
    const tail = if (value.len > buf.len) value[value.len - buf.len ..] else value;
    @memcpy(buf[0..tail.len], tail);
    return buf[0..tail.len];
}

/// Who a request is from, or the one way deriving that can fail.
const ClientAddr = union(enum) {
    addr: address.NetAddress,
    bad_forwarded_for,
};

/// Milestone-17 ruling 4. The socket peer, unless it is a trusted proxy that
/// forwarded the request, in which case the last entry of `x-forwarded-for` —
/// the one that proxy appended, and the only entry in the chain a client cannot
/// write.
///
/// A missing header falls back to the peer: a trusted proxy that adds no header
/// is a proxy nobody asked to trust anything about, and the peer is still true.
/// A header that is present but whose last entry is not an IP literal fails
/// closed with a 400 instead. Only a misconfigured proxy can produce that — a
/// client's spoofed entries can never terminate the chain — and falling back
/// there would hand the request the loopback identity this ruling exists to
/// take away.
fn clientAddr(
    trusted_proxies: []const u8,
    peer: address.NetAddress,
    forwarded_for: ?[]const u8,
) ClientAddr {
    if (!trustsPeer(trusted_proxies, peer)) return .{ .addr = peer };
    const chain = forwarded_for orelse return .{ .addr = peer };

    const start = if (std.mem.lastIndexOfScalar(u8, chain, ',')) |comma| comma + 1 else 0;
    const last = std.mem.trim(u8, chain[start..], " \t");
    const addr = address.NetAddress.parse(last) catch return .bad_forwarded_for;
    return .{ .addr = addr };
}

/// Whether `peer` is one of the configured trusted proxies. An element that is
/// not an IP literal matches nothing; `validate.zig` is what tells the operator
/// about it, and refusing to serve over a typo here would be a worse answer.
fn trustsPeer(trusted_proxies: []const u8, peer: address.NetAddress) bool {
    var it = model.trustedProxies(trusted_proxies);
    while (it.next()) |element| {
        const trusted = address.NetAddress.parse(element) catch continue;
        if (trusted.eql(peer)) return true;
    }
    return false;
}

/// The first value sent under `name`, borrowed from the request head.
fn headerValue(request: *http.Server.Request, name: []const u8) ?[]const u8 {
    var it = request.iterateHeaders();
    while (it.next()) |header| {
        if (std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(header.name, name)) return header.value;
    }
    return null;
}

/// Milestone-16 ruling 7. The cookie header is the one budget a foreign party
/// can spend: behind a reverse proxy on a shared domain, every other cookie set
/// for the domain rides along. Treating the whole header as absent then logs the
/// operator out of a working session with nothing in the log to explain it, so
/// an oversized header keeps the session pair, drops the rest, and says so.
fn copyCookie(request: *http.Server.Request, buf: []u8) []const u8 {
    const value = headerValue(request, "cookie") orelse return "";
    if (value.len <= buf.len) {
        @memcpy(buf[0..value.len], value);
        return buf[0..value.len];
    }

    const kept = sessionPairOnly(value, buf);
    // The session value is a random id and the name is a constant, so neither
    // the size nor the outcome discloses anything the client did not send.
    log.debug("cookie header of {d} bytes exceeds the {d} byte budget; {s}", .{
        value.len,
        buf.len,
        if (kept.len == 0) "no session cookie kept" else "kept the session cookie alone",
    });
    return kept;
}

/// Rewrites an oversized cookie header as just its session pair. Empty when the
/// header carries no session cookie, or when even the pair is over budget.
fn sessionPairOnly(value: []const u8, buf: []u8) []const u8 {
    const session = http_util.cookieValue(value, auth.cookie_name) orelse return "";
    const len = auth.cookie_name.len + 1 + session.len;
    if (len > buf.len) return "";

    @memcpy(buf[0..auth.cookie_name.len], auth.cookie_name);
    buf[auth.cookie_name.len] = '=';
    @memcpy(buf[auth.cookie_name.len + 1 ..][0..session.len], session);
    return buf[0..len];
}

/// The composition root's entry point: bind, serve, release.
///
/// A bind failure is warned and swallowed. The admin UI failing to come up must
/// not stop nxdns answering DNS, which is what the box is for; the operator
/// sees the warning and the DNS side keeps serving.
pub fn serve(state: *WebState, io: std.Io) void {
    const bind_address = net.IpAddress.parse(state.web.bind, state.web.port) catch {
        log.warn("web.bind '{s}' is not an IP address; the web interface is disabled", .{state.web.bind});
        return;
    };

    var server: Server = Server.listen(state.gpa, io, bind_address, state, .{}) catch |err| {
        log.warn("web interface cannot listen on {s}:{d}: {t}", .{ state.web.bind, state.web.port, err });
        return;
    };
    defer server.deinit(io);

    log.info("web interface listening on {f}", .{server.boundAddress()});
    server.serve(io);
}

const testing = std.testing;

test "the over-capacity response is a well formed 503" {
    try testing.expect(std.mem.startsWith(u8, over_capacity_response, "HTTP/1.1 503 "));
    const split = std.mem.findPosLinear(u8, over_capacity_response, 0, "\r\n\r\n").?;
    try testing.expectEqualStrings(over_capacity_body, over_capacity_response[split + 4 ..]);
}

test "an oversized cookie header keeps its session pair and nothing else" {
    var buf: [http_util.max_cookie_len]u8 = undefined;
    var header: std.ArrayList(u8) = .empty;
    defer header.deinit(testing.allocator);

    try header.appendSlice(testing.allocator, "consent=yes; ");
    try header.appendSlice(testing.allocator, auth.cookie_name ++ "=abc123; ");
    while (header.items.len < 2048) try header.appendSlice(testing.allocator, "ad_id=0123456789; ");

    const kept = sessionPairOnly(header.items, &buf);
    try testing.expectEqualStrings(auth.cookie_name ++ "=abc123", kept);
    try testing.expectEqualStrings("abc123", http_util.cookieValue(kept, auth.cookie_name).?);
}

test "an oversized cookie header with no session pair keeps nothing" {
    var buf: [http_util.max_cookie_len]u8 = undefined;
    var header: std.ArrayList(u8) = .empty;
    defer header.deinit(testing.allocator);

    while (header.items.len < 2048) try header.appendSlice(testing.allocator, "ad_id=0123456789; ");

    try testing.expectEqualStrings("", sessionPairOnly(header.items, &buf));
}

test "a session pair too long for the buffer keeps nothing" {
    var buf: [32]u8 = undefined;
    const header = auth.cookie_name ++ "=" ++ ("v" ** 64);
    try testing.expectEqualStrings("", sessionPairOnly(header, &buf));
}

test "an unconfigured password leaves every route open" {
    var threaded: std.Io.Threaded = .init(testing.allocator, .{});
    defer threaded.deinit();

    var state: WebState = .{ .gpa = testing.allocator };
    const request = testRequest();
    try testing.expect(sessionAuth(&state, threaded.io(), &request));
}

test "a configured password with no session store refuses rather than opens" {
    var threaded: std.Io.Threaded = .init(testing.allocator, .{});
    defer threaded.deinit();

    var state: WebState = .{ .gpa = testing.allocator, .live_hash = .init("$argon2id$...") };
    const request = testRequest();
    try testing.expect(!sessionAuth(&state, threaded.io(), &request));
}

test "an unwired limiter throttles nothing" {
    var state: WebState = .{ .gpa = testing.allocator };
    const request = testRequest();
    try testing.expect(bucketLimit(&state, undefined, &request).allowed);
}

test "the seam doubles are usable in place of the production checks" {
    var state: WebState = .{ .gpa = testing.allocator, .check_auth = allowAll, .check_limit = neverLimit };
    const request = testRequest();
    try testing.expect(state.check_auth(&state, undefined, &request));
    try testing.expect(state.check_limit(&state, undefined, &request).allowed);
}

/// `io` is never reached on these paths, so the tests above pass `undefined`.
fn testRequest() http_util.Request {
    return .{
        .http = undefined,
        .method = .GET,
        .path = .empty,
        .raw_path = "/api/groups",
        .query = "",
        .id = null,
        .cookie = "",
        .accept_encoding = "",
        .if_none_match = "",
        .peer = .{ .ip4 = .loopback(0) },
        .client_addr = .{ .ip4 = .loopback(0) },
        .arena = testing.allocator,
    };
}

fn ip(text: []const u8) address.NetAddress {
    return address.NetAddress.parse(text) catch unreachable;
}

test "with no trusted proxy configured the socket peer is the client" {
    const peer = ip("192.0.2.1");
    try testing.expect(clientAddr("", peer, "203.0.113.9").addr.eql(peer));
}

test "a spoofed forwarded-for from an untrusted peer is ignored" {
    const peer = ip("192.0.2.1");
    try testing.expect(clientAddr("10.0.0.1", peer, "203.0.113.9").addr.eql(peer));
}

test "a trusted peer is identified by the last forwarded-for entry" {
    const peer = ip("10.0.0.1");
    const derived = clientAddr("10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2", peer, "203.0.113.9, 198.51.100.7");
    try testing.expect(derived.addr.eql(ip("198.51.100.7")));
}

test "a trusted peer that forwards nothing stays itself" {
    const peer = ip("10.0.0.1");
    try testing.expect(clientAddr("10.0.0.1", peer, null).addr.eql(peer));
}

test "an IPv6 proxy and an IPv6 forwarded entry work the same way" {
    const peer = ip("fd00::1");
    const derived = clientAddr("fd00::1", peer, "2001:db8::5, 2001:db8::7");
    try testing.expect(derived.addr.eql(ip("2001:db8::7")));
}

test "an oversized forwarded-for keeps the entry the proxy appended" {
    var header: std.ArrayList(u8) = .empty;
    defer header.deinit(testing.allocator);
    while (header.items.len < 4096) try header.appendSlice(testing.allocator, "203.0.113.9, ");
    try header.appendSlice(testing.allocator, "198.51.100.7");

    // What the connection would copy: the tail alone, the head thrown away.
    const tail = header.items[header.items.len - http_util.max_xff_len ..];
    const derived = clientAddr("10.0.0.1", ip("10.0.0.1"), tail);
    try testing.expect(derived.addr.eql(ip("198.51.100.7")));
}

test "a trusted peer whose forwarded-for has no valid last entry is refused" {
    const peer = ip("10.0.0.1");
    try testing.expectEqual(
        ClientAddr.bad_forwarded_for,
        std.meta.activeTag(clientAddr("10.0.0.1", peer, "203.0.113.9, not-an-ip")),
    );
    try testing.expectEqual(
        ClientAddr.bad_forwarded_for,
        std.meta.activeTag(clientAddr("10.0.0.1", peer, "")),
    );
    // An oversized header whose tail cuts the last entry in half is the same
    // failure, and must not degrade to the exemptible socket peer.
    try testing.expectEqual(
        ClientAddr.bad_forwarded_for,
        std.meta.activeTag(clientAddr("10.0.0.1", peer, "8.51.100.7000")),
    );
}

test "a trusted-proxy element that is not an IP literal trusts nobody" {
    const peer = ip("10.0.0.1");
    try testing.expect(!trustsPeer("proxy.example", peer));
    try testing.expect(trustsPeer("proxy.example, 10.0.0.1", peer));
    try testing.expect(!trustsPeer("", peer));
}