# Configuration reference Every section, field and collection nxdns accepts, with its type, default, unit, validation rule and the subsystem that consumes it. Source of truth: `src/config/model.zig` (the model and the defaults), `src/config/validate.zig` (the rules), `src/config/{bootstrap,import,export}.zig` (the lifecycle). For how the file, the database and `export`/`import` relate to each other, see [the configuration model](../explanation/configuration-model.md). For the commands that read and write configuration, see [the CLI reference](cli.md). ## File format The file is ZON: a top-level anonymous struct whose fields are the sections and collections below. Enum values are ZON enum literals (`.level = .err`, `.response = .nxdomain`). Strings are double-quoted. The file may be at most 4 MiB (`max_config_bytes` in `src/config/import.zig`); beyond that the error is `ConfigTooLarge`. A syntax error is reported with its line and column. Absent fields keep their defaults, both in the file and in the database. A settings key stored in the database that the running binary does not know is warned about and ignored, never an error. ### The `logging.level = .err` quirk The log level `error` is a Zig keyword, so the ZON and model tag is `.err` while the database and the settings API store the operator-facing word `"error"`. The file says `.err`; `GET /api/settings` says `"error"`. `"err"` is not accepted as database text, and `.error` is not a ZON tag. ## What is not in the file Storage paths are process arguments, not configuration: | Argument | Default | Meaning | | --- | --- | --- | | `--data-dir DIR` | `/var/lib/nxdns` | Holds `config.db` and `querylog.db`; see [files and directories](files-and-directories.md). | | `--config FILE` | `/etc/nxdns/config.zon` | Names the seed file. | | `--web-dev DIR` | — | `run` only; serves the web interface from a directory instead of the embedded assets. | ## Scalar sections The "Key" column is the settings key as stored in the database (`section.field`); in the file the same field lives inside its section block, for example `.dns = .{ .port = 53 }`. ### upstream Timeouts for talking to upstream resolvers. | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `upstream.attempt_timeout_ms` | u32 | 2500 | ms | 100–120000, and not above `total_timeout_ms` | deadline on one attempt against one upstream inside the pool's failover loop (`src/upstream/pool.zig`), the whole attempt including the connect | | `upstream.read_timeout_ms` | u32 | 3000 | ms | 100–120000 | read deadline on conditional-forward-zone exchanges (`src/local/forward_client.zig`) | | `upstream.total_timeout_ms` | u32 | 5000 | ms | 100–120000 | per-query budget of the upstream pool (`src/upstream/pool.zig`): every failover attempt together, not one of them; also the `nxdns check` probe deadline | The two pool budgets nest. `attempt_timeout_ms` bounds one try against one upstream; when it expires the pool records the failure and moves to the next candidate. `total_timeout_ms` bounds the whole loop, so a query against five unreachable upstreams costs the total budget once, not five attempt budgets in a row. When the total expires the in-flight attempt is canceled and the query fails with a timeout. `read_timeout_ms` is unrelated to both. It bounds a different subsystem — the conditional-forward-zone client — so no cross-check relates it to the pool's budgets, and it is free to sit above either of them. ### dns The plain DNS listener (UDP and TCP). | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `dns.bind_ipv4` | string | `"0.0.0.0"` | IP address | must parse as an IPv4 literal | UDP/TCP listener bind (`src/app.zig`) | | `dns.bind_ipv6` | string | `"::"` | IP address | must parse as an IPv6 literal | UDP/TCP listener bind (`src/app.zig`) | | `dns.port` | u16 | 53 | port | 1–65535 (0 is refused) | UDP/TCP listener port | | `dns.rate_limit` | u32 | 1000 | queries per window | at least 1 | per-client DNS rate limiter (`src/server/rate_limiter.zig`) | | `dns.rate_window_seconds` | u32 | 60 | seconds | 1–3600 | window of the same limiter | `dns.bind_ipv4` and `dns.bind_ipv6` each name one socket of the dual-stack pair, so each is required to be a literal of its own family. An IPv4 wildcard in `dns.bind_ipv6` is refused: it would bind IPv4 as the "v6" socket and make the real IPv4 bind fail with `AddressInUse`, silently removing the IPv6 service. ### blocking What a blocked query gets back. | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `blocking.response` | enum `.zero` \| `.nxdomain` | `.zero` | — | one of the two tags | blocked-response synthesis (`src/filter/response.zig`): `.zero` answers 0.0.0.0 / `::`, `.nxdomain` answers NXDOMAIN | | `blocking.ttl` | u32 | 5 | seconds | at most 86400; 0 allowed | TTL on the synthesized block answer | ### cache | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `cache.size` | u32 | 10000 | entries | 1–1000000 | DNS answer cache capacity (`src/cache/dns_cache.zig`) | | `cache.negative_ttl_max` | u32 | 3600 | seconds | at most 86400 | cap on cached negative answers; 0 disables negative caching | The cache's slot array is allocated in full at startup, so `cache.size` carries a ceiling: it is a sanity bound against a typo, not a promise that the value fits in the box's memory. There is no "off" value — to run without a cache, set `cache.size` to 1. ### web The web interface and REST API. | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `web.enabled` | bool | true | — | — | gates the whole web stack: server, sessions, SSE hub, API limiter (`src/app.zig`) | | `web.bind` | string | `"0.0.0.0"` | IP address | must parse as an IP address of either family | web listener bind (`src/web/server.zig`) | | `web.port` | u16 | 8080 | port | 1–65535 (0 is refused) | web listener port | | `web.password` | string | `""` | — | must not be set together with `web.password_hash` | operator input only; hashed at import and discarded. Never a settings row — see [Password and hash](#password-and-hash) | | `web.password_hash` | string | `""` | — | — | argon2id PHC string verified at login (`src/web/auth.zig`); `""` disables authentication | | `web.session_ttl_hours` | u16 | 24 | hours | at least 1 | session expiry and cookie `Max-Age` (`src/web/auth.zig`) | | `web.api_rate_limit_per_min` | u32 | 300 | requests per minute | at least 1 | API token-bucket limiter (`src/web/api_limiter.zig`) | | `web.api_localhost_exempt` | bool | true | — | — | loopback requests skip the API limiter | | `web.sse_max_connections_per_ip` | u16 | 3 | connections | at least 1 | cap on concurrent SSE streams per client address | | `web.trusted_proxies` | string | `""` | — | comma-separated IP literals | reverse proxies whose `X-Forwarded-For` nxdns believes (`src/web/server.zig`); empty trusts none | ### doh_server The DNS-over-HTTPS listener (server side, for clients on the LAN). See [enable DoH and DoT](../how-to/enable-doh-and-dot.md). | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `doh_server.enabled` | bool | false | — | — | gates the DoH listener (`src/server/doh_server.zig`) | | `doh_server.bind` | string | `"0.0.0.0"` | IP address | must parse as an IP address of either family | DoH listener bind | | `doh_server.port` | u16 | 443 | port | 1–65535 (0 is refused, enabled or not) | DoH listener port | | `doh_server.cert_path` | string | `"/etc/nxdns/cert.pem"` | path | non-empty when enabled | certificate loaded into the hot-reloading `CertStore`; the file itself is loaded and paired with the key by `nxdns check`, not by the validator | | `doh_server.key_path` | string | `"/etc/nxdns/key.pem"` | path | non-empty when enabled | private key for the same; `nxdns check` warns when it is readable beyond its owner | ### dot_server The DNS-over-TLS listener. Same shape as `doh_server`; only the default port differs. | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `dot_server.enabled` | bool | false | — | — | gates the DoT listener (`src/server/dot_server.zig`) | | `dot_server.bind` | string | `"0.0.0.0"` | IP address | must parse as an IP address of either family | DoT listener bind | | `dot_server.port` | u16 | 853 | port | 1–65535 (0 is refused, enabled or not) | DoT listener port | | `dot_server.cert_path` | string | `"/etc/nxdns/cert.pem"` | path | non-empty when enabled | certificate, shared `CertStore` with hot reload | | `dot_server.key_path` | string | `"/etc/nxdns/key.pem"` | path | non-empty when enabled | private key for the same | ### edns | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `edns.ecs_mode` | enum `.strip` \| `.forward` | `.strip` | — | one of the two tags | EDNS Client Subnet handling in the query path (`src/server/handler.zig`, `src/dns/edns.zig`): `.strip` removes the client subnet before forwarding, `.forward` passes it through | ### logging Process log and query log behavior. | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `logging.level` | enum `.err` \| `.warn` \| `.info` \| `.debug` | `.info` | — | one of the four tags; stored as `"error"` / `"warn"` / `"info"` / `"debug"` | log threshold (`src/platform/logging.zig`) | | `logging.retention_days` | u16 | 30 | days | at least 1 | query-log pruning cutoff (`src/storage/retention.zig`) and the client tracker's last-seen cutoff (`src/server/clients.zig`) | | `logging.query_log_buffer_max` | u32 | 10000 | entries | 1–1000000 | in-memory query-log ring size and backpressure cap (`src/storage/logger.zig`) | | `logging.hide_domains` | bool | false | — | — | the query log stores a hidden marker instead of the domain | | `logging.hide_client_ips` | bool | false | — | — | the query log stores a hidden marker instead of the client address | | `logging.output` | enum `.stderr` \| `.syslog` \| `.file` | `.stderr` | — | one of the three tags | log sink selection (`src/platform/logging.zig`); `.stderr` and `.syslog` both write to stderr (journald captures it), `.file` rotates | | `logging.file_path` | string | `"/var/log/nxdns/nxdns.log"` | path | when `output` is `.file`: non-empty and starting with `/` | rotating log file; its directory also feeds the disk monitor. The binary does not create the directory | | `logging.max_size_mb` | u32 | 50 | MiB | at least 1 | rotation trigger for the log file | | `logging.max_files` | u8 | 5 | files | at least 1 | log files kept in total, the live one included, so the highest rotated generation is `max_files - 1`; the default 5 keeps `nxdns.log` plus `nxdns.log.1` through `nxdns.log.4`, and a value of 1 keeps only the live file, which rotation deletes rather than renames | ### disk Free-space thresholds for the data directory. Below them the query-log writer, the client tracker and the blocklist scheduler are throttled (`src/storage/disk_monitor.zig`); DNS resolution is never gated. | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `disk.min_free_mb` | u32 | 200 | MiB | at least 1, and not above `warn_free_mb` | `critical` threshold | | `disk.warn_free_mb` | u32 | 500 | MiB | at least 1 | `warn` threshold | ### blocklist_update | Key | Type | Default | Unit | Validation | Consumed by | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `blocklist_update.enabled` | bool | true | — | — | blocklist refresh scheduler (`src/filter/manager.zig`); when false the scheduler stops after the startup pass and only a manual refresh runs | | `blocklist_update.interval_hours` | u16 | 24 | hours | at least 1 | sleep between refresh passes and the per-source staleness test; each pass is preceded by the [orphan sweep](files-and-directories.md#the-orphan-sweep), which runs even when the pass itself is skipped for disk space | ## Collections Collections are ZON lists of structs. Fields without a default are required. Runtime columns (first/last seen timestamps, per-source download counters) are deliberately not part of the model: import sets timestamps to the import time and export omits them, which is what keeps the round trip byte-stable. ### groups Client groups. A group named `default` is required; every client not assigned elsewhere lands in it, and import guarantees it keeps database id 1. | Field | Type | Default | Validation | |---|---|---|---| | `name` | string | required | non-empty, unique | | `safe_search` | bool | false | — | Consumed by the filter engine (`src/filter/matcher.zig`); `safe_search` triggers the safe-search rewrite in the query path. ### upstreams Upstream resolvers. At least one enabled upstream is required. | Field | Type | Default | Validation | |---|---|---|---| | `url` | string | required | an `https://` (DoH) or `tls://` (DoT) endpoint accepted by `transport.Endpoint.parse`; unique; a `tls://` host must be an IP literal | | `priority` | i32 | 100 | — (lower is tried first) | | `enabled` | bool | true | — | | `tls_name` | string | `""` | DoT only — a `tls_name` on an `https://` upstream is an error; when set it must be a valid domain name | Consumed by the upstream pool (`src/upstream/pool.zig`): entries are sorted by ascending priority and tried in order with failover. `tls_name` sets SNI and the certificate verification name for a `tls://` upstream written as an IP literal; empty means "verify by the URL host" (`src/upstream/dot_client.zig`). A `tls://` upstream's host must be an IP literal. nxdns does not resolve an upstream's own name — that is a bootstrap problem, and the DoT client refuses a non-literal host on every dial — so the validator rejects the hostname form rather than letting it fail at query time as an unreachable upstream. Write the address and put the name in `tls_name`: ```zig .{ .url = "tls://9.9.9.9:853", .tls_name = "dns.quad9.net" }, ``` A DoH upstream is not affected: `https://` goes through the HTTP client, which resolves normally, so a hostname there is the usual form. ### clients Known clients with a fixed group assignment. | Field | Type | Default | Validation | |---|---|---|---| | `ip` | string | required | an IP address; unique after canonicalization (`FD00::1` and `fd00:0:0:0:0:0:0:1` collide) | | `name` | string | `""` | — (display only, never read by the resolver) | | `group` | string | `"default"` | must name a declared group | Consumed by the filter engine's exact address-to-group lookup (`src/filter/matcher.zig`). ### client_prefixes Group assignment by CIDR prefix, for clients without an exact entry. | Field | Type | Default | Validation | |---|---|---|---| | `prefix` | string | required | a CIDR prefix (`192.168.2.0/24`, `fd00:abcd::/48`); unique after canonicalization | | `group` | string | `"default"` | must name a declared group | | `priority` | i32 | 100 | — (ties on match are broken by lower priority) | Consumed by the filter engine's longest-prefix match (`src/filter/matcher.zig`). ### blocklist_sources Downloadable blocklists. | Field | Type | Default | Validation | |---|---|---|---| | `url` | string | required | an `http://` or `https://` URL with a host; unique | | `name` | string | required | non-empty | | `enabled` | bool | true | — | | `is_suggested` | bool | false | — (web UI hint only, never read by the resolver) | Consumed by the blocklist manager (`src/filter/manager.zig`): downloaded by the fetcher and compiled into domain sets. A disabled source is neither downloaded nor loaded. ### group_sources Which groups consult which blocklist sources. | Field | Type | Default | Validation | |---|---|---|---| | `group` | string | required | must name a declared group | | `source_url` | string | required | must name a declared blocklist source's `url`; the (group, source_url) pair is unique | Consumed by the filter engine when assembling each group's compiled domain sets (`src/filter/matcher.zig`). A link to a disabled source is skipped. ### rules Per-group allow and block overrides, checked before the blocklists. | Field | Type | Default | Validation | |---|---|---|---| | `group` | string | required | must name a declared group | | `pattern` | string | required | see below | | `kind` | enum `.exact` \| `.wildcard` | required | — | | `action` | enum `.allow` \| `.block` | required | — | Pattern rules: an `.exact` pattern is a plain domain name and may not contain `*`. A `.wildcard` pattern must contain at least one label that is exactly `*` (`*.tracker.example`, or `*` alone), and every other label must be a legal DNS label. `ads*.example` is not a valid wildcard. Consumed by the filter engine's rule sets (`src/filter/rules.zig`). ### local_records Local DNS answers, served without touching any upstream. | Field | Type | Default | Validation | |---|---|---|---| | `name` | string | required | a valid domain name | | `rtype` | enum `.a` \| `.aaaa` \| `.cname` | required | stored as `A` / `AAAA` / `CNAME` | | `value` | string | required | an IPv4 address for `.a`, an IPv6 address for `.aaaa`, a domain name for `.cname` | | `ttl` | u32 | 300 | 1–604800 seconds | The (name, rtype, value) triple is unique. Consumed by the local records table in the query path (`src/local/records.zig`). ### forward_zones Zones resolved by a specific resolver instead of the configured upstreams, for LAN or corporate domains. | Field | Type | Default | Validation | |---|---|---|---| | `zone` | string | required | a valid domain name; unique | | `resolver` | string | required | `udp://IP:port` or `tcp://IP:port`; the host must be an IP literal and the port is mandatory | The resolver host must be an IP literal because resolving the resolver's own name would be a bootstrap problem. Matching is longest suffix (`src/local/forward_zones.zig`); the exchange is UDP then TCP (`src/local/forward_client.zig`) with `upstream.read_timeout_ms` as the read deadline. ## Password and hash Exactly one of `web.password` and `web.password_hash` may be set; setting both is refused (`PasswordAndHashBothSet` — ambiguity in a security setting). - `web.password` is operator input only. At import time it is hashed with argon2id (OWASP parameters: t=2, m=19 MiB, p=1, PHC encoding) into `web.password_hash` and discarded. There is no `web.password` settings row, and `nxdns export` always writes `.password = ""`. - `web.password_hash` is the stored argon2id PHC string. Supplying it directly, for example from a previous export, is how a backup restores authentication without knowing the password. - Both empty disables web authentication entirely. Because the export carries the hash and re-importing an exported file takes the "password is empty" branch, the export/import round trip preserves the hash byte for byte. See [set up admin authentication](../how-to/set-up-admin-authentication.md). ## Validation errors `nxdns check`, `nxdns import` and the `nxdns run` that seeds a database from the file all print one `FAIL path: message` line per problem, and report every problem rather than the first. A finding that is legal but almost certainly unintended is prefixed `WARN` instead: it does not change the exit code, and it is printed by all three even when nothing failed, so an accepted configuration still says what is odd about it. A url in a diagnostic is redacted to its scheme, host and port. The userinfo, the path, the query and the fragment are dropped, and control characters are escaped. These lines reach the journal, and every one of those parts can carry a credential: a NextDNS DoH upstream is `https://dns.nextdns.io/abcd12`, where the path segment is the whole account identifier. The field path beside the message names the entry, so `blocklist_sources[1].url` still says which one to go and fix. What redaction cannot remove is the host, because a hostname is not a secret in the general case — it is resolved publicly and offered as SNI on every connection — and dropping it would leave a diagnostic that names nothing worth reading. A vendor that puts an account identifier in the hostname therefore has that identifier appear in any line naming the entry. NextDNS is the example: `abcd12.dns.nextdns.io` is a profile id. Two things limit the exposure. A hostname `tls://` upstream is rejected by the validator (see `upstreams` above), so the DoT form of that URL can only reach the log once, in the line rejecting it — never on every failover. And NextDNS publishes a DoH endpoint, `https://dns.nextdns.io/abcd12`, whose identifier sits in the path and is redacted in full; configure that form and nothing identifying reaches the log at all. The error set is `validate.ValidateError` in `src/config/validate.zig`: | Error | Raised by | | --- | --- | | `NoUpstreams` | no upstream has `enabled = true` | | `BadUpstreamUrl` | an upstream `url` is not an `https://` or `tls://` endpoint | | `UpstreamHostNotIpLiteral` | a `tls://` upstream `url` names a host instead of an IP literal | | `DuplicateUpstreamUrl` | two upstreams share a `url` | | `BadTlsName` | a `tls_name` is not a valid domain name | | `TlsNameOnNonTlsUpstream` | a `tls_name` on a non-`tls://` upstream | | `MissingDefaultGroup` | no group is named `default` | | `DuplicateGroupName` | two groups share a `name` | | `EmptyGroupName` | a group `name` is empty | | `UnknownGroup` | a client, prefix, group source or rule names a group that is not declared | | `BadClientIp` / `DuplicateClientIp` | a client `ip` is unparseable, or collides after canonicalization | | `BadClientPrefix` / `DuplicateClientPrefix` | the same for a `client_prefixes.prefix` | | `BadSourceUrl` / `DuplicateSourceUrl` / `EmptySourceName` | blocklist source fields | | `UnknownSource` / `DuplicateGroupSource` | `group_sources` links | | `BadRulePattern` | a rule `pattern` does not match its `kind` | | `BadLocalRecordName` / `BadLocalRecordValue` / `DuplicateLocalRecord` | local record fields | | `BadForwardZone` / `DuplicateForwardZone` / `BadResolverUrl` | forward zone fields | | `BadPort` | a port field is 0 | | `BadTimeout` | a timeout is outside 100–120000 ms, or `attempt` is above `total` | | `BadTtl` | `blocking.ttl`, `cache.negative_ttl_max`, a record `ttl`, `web.session_ttl_hours` or `blocklist_update.interval_hours` outside its range | | `BadCacheSize` | `cache.size` outside 1–1000000 | | `BadRetention` | `logging.retention_days` below 1, or `logging.query_log_buffer_max` outside 1–1000000 | | `BadLogRotation` | `logging.max_size_mb` or `logging.max_files` below 1 | | `BadDiskThresholds` | a threshold below 1, or `min_free_mb` above `warn_free_mb` | | `BadRateLimit` | `dns.rate_limit`, `dns.rate_window_seconds`, `web.api_rate_limit_per_min` or `web.sse_max_connections_per_ip` out of range | | `BadBindAddress` | a bind field is not an IP address, or not of the required family | | `BadTrustedProxy` | an element of `web.trusted_proxies` is not an IP literal | | `MissingCertPath` / `MissingKeyPath` | an enabled TLS listener with an empty path | | `MissingLogPath` | `logging.output = .file` with an empty or relative `file_path` | | `PasswordAndHashBothSet` | both `web.password` and `web.password_hash` are set | Warnings are a separate set, outside `ValidateError` because they are not failures. There is one: | Warning | Raised by | | --- | --- | | `SourceInNoGroup` | a `blocklist_sources` entry that no `group_sources` link names; it downloads and blocks nothing until a group uses it | ## Minimal working example The smallest file that passes validation: a `default` group and one enabled upstream. Everything else keeps its default. ```zon .{ .groups = .{ .{ .name = "default" } }, .upstreams = .{ .{ .url = "https://dns.quad9.net/dns-query" } }, } ``` ## Fuller annotated example ```zon .{ // Plain DNS on the standard port, rate-limited per client. .dns = .{ .bind_ipv4 = "0.0.0.0", .bind_ipv6 = "::", .port = 53, .rate_limit = 1000, .rate_window_seconds = 60, }, // Blocked queries answer 0.0.0.0 / :: with a 5 second TTL. .blocking = .{ .response = .zero, .ttl = 5 }, .cache = .{ .size = 10000, .negative_ttl_max = 3600 }, // Web UI on 8080. The password is hashed at import and never stored; // leave .password_hash out when setting .password (they are exclusive). .web = .{ .enabled = true, .port = 8080, .password = "correct horse battery staple", .session_ttl_hours = 24, }, // Serve DoT to the LAN. The key file should be mode 0600. .dot_server = .{ .enabled = true, .port = 853, .cert_path = "/etc/nxdns/cert.pem", .key_path = "/etc/nxdns/key.pem", }, // Strip EDNS Client Subnet before forwarding (the default). .edns = .{ .ecs_mode = .strip }, // ".err" in the file; the settings API shows it as "error". .logging = .{ .level = .err, .retention_days = 14 }, .blocklist_update = .{ .enabled = true, .interval_hours = 24 }, // "default" is mandatory. Additional groups get their own rules, // blocklists and safe-search flag. .groups = .{ .{ .name = "default" }, .{ .name = "kids", .safe_search = true }, }, // Lower priority is tried first; the second entry is a failover. // tls_name is needed when a tls:// upstream is written as an IP // literal, so certificate verification has a DNS name to match. .upstreams = .{ .{ .url = "https://dns.quad9.net/dns-query", .priority = 10 }, .{ .url = "tls://9.9.9.9:853", .priority = 20, .tls_name = "dns.quad9.net" }, }, // Exact client assignments win over prefixes. .clients = .{ .{ .ip = "192.168.1.20", .name = "tablet", .group = "kids" }, }, .client_prefixes = .{ .{ .prefix = "192.168.2.0/24", .group = "kids" }, }, .blocklist_sources = .{ .{ .url = "https://lists.example/ads.txt", .name = "ads" }, }, .group_sources = .{ .{ .group = "kids", .source_url = "https://lists.example/ads.txt" }, }, // Overrides beat blocklists. Wildcards need a label that is exactly "*". .rules = .{ .{ .group = "default", .pattern = "allowed.example", .kind = .exact, .action = .allow }, .{ .group = "kids", .pattern = "*.tracker.example", .kind = .wildcard, .action = .block }, }, // Local names, answered without any upstream. .local_records = .{ .{ .name = "nas.lan", .rtype = .a, .value = "192.168.1.5" }, .{ .name = "www.lan", .rtype = .cname, .value = "nas.lan" }, }, // Everything under corp.lan goes to the LAN resolver directly. .forward_zones = .{ .{ .zone = "corp.lan", .resolver = "udp://192.168.1.1:53" }, }, } ```