From 5e7fbfede88279efe4fde7c6058d2844fa29400f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: m5r <mokhtar@mial.net>
Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2026 01:06:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] dns fuzz targets: smith corpus, llvm-backed fuzz artifact

---
 build.zig               |  27 +++++-
 tests/fuzz/corpus.zig   | 188 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tests/fuzz/dns_fuzz.zig | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 387 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/fuzz/corpus.zig
 create mode 100644 tests/fuzz/dns_fuzz.zig

diff --git a/build.zig b/build.zig
index eb50f2a..3a2239f 100644
--- a/build.zig
+++ b/build.zig
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ pub fn build(b: *std.Build) void {
 
     const integration = b.option(bool, "integration", "Run hermetic integration tests (loopback sockets only)") orelse false;
     const live = b.option(bool, "live", "Run tests that reach external network hosts") orelse false;
+    const fuzz = b.option(bool, "fuzz", "Build the fuzz targets with the LLVM backend (required for --fuzz)") orelse false;
     const version_string = b.option([]const u8, "version-string", "Version reported by `nxdns version`") orelse "0.1.0-dev";
     const git_commit = b.option([]const u8, "git-commit", "Git commit reported by `nxdns version`") orelse "unknown";
 
@@ -52,7 +53,31 @@ pub fn build(b: *std.Build) void {
     tests.root_module.addAnonymousImport("test_fixtures", .{
         .root_source_file = b.path("tests/fixtures/fixtures.zig"),
     });
-    b.step("test", "Run the test suite").dependOn(&b.addRunArtifact(tests).step);
+    const test_step = b.step("test", "Run the test suite");
+    test_step.dependOn(&b.addRunArtifact(tests).step);
+
+    // Fuzz targets compile as a second test artifact with `dns` as a named module
+    // (a file belongs to one module per compilation; the aggregator keeps owning
+    // the in-file tests). `-Dfuzz` opts into the LLVM backend, which `--fuzz`
+    // needs for sanitizer coverage; stock 0.16.0 also requires a patched
+    // test_runner.zig for fuzz mode — see specs/milestone-2.md.
+    const dns_mod = b.createModule(.{
+        .root_source_file = b.path("src/dns/dns.zig"),
+        .target = target,
+        .optimize = optimize,
+    });
+    const fuzz_mod = b.createModule(.{
+        .root_source_file = b.path("tests/fuzz/dns_fuzz.zig"),
+        .target = target,
+        .optimize = optimize,
+    });
+    fuzz_mod.addImport("dns", dns_mod);
+    const fuzz_tests = b.addTest(.{
+        .name = "fuzz",
+        .use_llvm = if (fuzz) true else null,
+        .root_module = fuzz_mod,
+    });
+    test_step.dependOn(&b.addRunArtifact(fuzz_tests).step);
 
     const cross = b.step("cross", "Build static musl executables for every deploy target");
     for (cross_targets) |triple| {
diff --git a/tests/fuzz/corpus.zig b/tests/fuzz/corpus.zig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86fc527
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/fuzz/corpus.zig
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+//! Seed corpus for `dns_fuzz.zig`.
+//!
+//! The packets below are copies of the fixtures `src/dns/packet.zig` keeps
+//! private to its own tests, plus the malformed shapes worth reaching on the
+//! first run rather than after the fuzzer rediscovers them. They are copies on
+//! purpose: a fuzz seed that changes whenever a unit-test fixture is edited is
+//! a corpus that silently loses coverage.
+//!
+//! `std.testing.Smith` does not consume a corpus entry as raw parser input. It
+//! reads a byte stream: a slice is a little-endian `u32` length followed by
+//! that many bytes, and an integer is a little-endian `u64`. `sliceInput` and
+//! `sliceIntInput` encode packets into that stream, which is why every entry in
+//! `inputs` is length-prefixed.
+
+const std = @import("std");
+const dns = @import("dns");
+
+/// A query for example.com A with an EDNS(0) OPT record advertising 4096
+/// bytes: id 0x1234, RD set, one question, one additional.
+pub const query =
+    "\x12\x34\x01\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01" ++
+    "\x07example\x03com\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x29\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
+
+/// The matching response: a CNAME to www.example.com and its A record, both
+/// with compressed owner names, plus the echoed OPT record.
+pub const response =
+    "\x12\x34\x81\x80\x00\x01\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x01" ++
+    "\x07example\x03com\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01" ++
+    "\xc0\x0c\x00\x05\x00\x01\x00\x00\x01\x2c\x00\x06\x03www\xc0\x0c" ++
+    "\xc0\x29\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x3c\x00\x04\x5d\xb8\xd8\x22" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x29\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
+
+/// One record in every section, all with root owner names and A rdata, so the
+/// walk crosses all three record sections.
+pub const all_sections = "\x00\x01\x81\x80\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x01" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x64\x00\x04\x01\x01\x01\x01" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x1e\x00\x04\x02\x02\x02\x02" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x50\x00\x04\x03\x03\x03\x03";
+
+/// An OPT record whose TTL word carries the DO bit, which `decrementTtls` must
+/// leave alone.
+pub const opt_do_bit = "\x12\x34\x81\x80\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x64\x00\x04\x01\x02\x03\x04" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x29\x10\x00\x00\x00\x80\x00\x00\x00";
+
+/// A query whose OPT record carries an EDNS Client Subnet option for
+/// 192.168.1.0/24, so the option list and the ECS parser both get exercised.
+pub const opt_ecs = "\x12\x34\x01\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01" ++
+    "\x07example\x03com\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x29\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b" ++
+    "\x00\x08\x00\x07\x00\x01\x18\x00\xc0\xa8\x01";
+
+/// A question name that points at itself: no chain can terminate.
+pub const pointer_loop = "\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" ++
+    "\xc0\x0c\x00\x01\x00\x01";
+
+/// A question name that points forwards, which the strictly-decreasing rule
+/// rejects.
+pub const forward_pointer = "\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" ++
+    "\xc0\x12\x00\x01\x00\x01\x03com\x00";
+
+/// A leading 0x40 control byte: a reserved label type, and also what a 64-byte
+/// label encodes to.
+pub const reserved_label = "\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" ++
+    "\x40abc\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01";
+
+/// An RDLENGTH of 0x40 with four bytes of rdata behind it.
+pub const rdlength_overrun = "\x00\x01\x81\x80\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x0a\x00\x40\x01\x02\x03\x04";
+
+/// ANCOUNT claims two answers and one follows.
+pub const count_too_large = "\x00\x01\x81\x80\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00" ++
+    "\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x0a\x00\x04\x01\x02\x03\x04";
+
+/// A header and nothing else, which is well-formed.
+pub const header_only = "\x00\x01\x81\x83" ++ "\x00" ** 8;
+
+pub const packets = [_][]const u8{
+    query,
+    response,
+    all_sections,
+    opt_do_bit,
+    opt_ecs,
+    pointer_loop,
+    forward_pointer,
+    reserved_label,
+    rdlength_overrun,
+    count_too_large,
+    header_only,
+};
+
+/// A name at offset 0 followed by `link_count` compression pointers, each
+/// pointing at the one before it. Parsing from the topmost link follows
+/// `link_count` jumps, so a chain longer than `max_compression_jumps` is the
+/// shortest input that reaches the jump cap on a chain that is otherwise legal.
+fn pointerChain(comptime link_count: usize) *const [3 + 2 * link_count]u8 {
+    return &struct {
+        const value: [3 + 2 * link_count]u8 = blk: {
+            var buf: [3 + 2 * link_count]u8 = undefined;
+            buf[0..3].* = "\x01a\x00".*;
+            for (0..link_count) |i| {
+                const target: u16 = if (i == 0) 0 else @intCast(3 + 2 * (i - 1));
+                std.mem.writeInt(u16, buf[3 + 2 * i ..][0..2], 0xc000 | target, .big);
+            }
+            break :blk buf;
+        };
+    }.value;
+}
+
+fn chainTopOffset(comptime link_count: usize) u64 {
+    return 3 + 2 * (link_count - 1);
+}
+
+const max_jumps = dns.types.max_compression_jumps;
+
+/// A chain that ends exactly at the jump cap, and one link past it.
+pub const chain_at_cap = pointerChain(max_jumps);
+pub const chain_past_cap = pointerChain(max_jumps + 1);
+
+/// Encodes `bytes` as a single `Smith.slice` value.
+fn sliceInput(comptime bytes: []const u8) *const [4 + bytes.len]u8 {
+    return &struct {
+        const value: [4 + bytes.len]u8 = blk: {
+            var buf: [4 + bytes.len]u8 = undefined;
+            std.mem.writeInt(u32, buf[0..4], @intCast(bytes.len), .little);
+            buf[4..].* = bytes[0..bytes.len].*;
+            break :blk buf;
+        };
+    }.value;
+}
+
+/// Encodes `bytes` as a `Smith.slice` value followed by one integer, which the
+/// name target reads as an offset and the TTL target as an elapsed time.
+fn sliceIntInput(comptime bytes: []const u8, comptime int: u64) *const [12 + bytes.len]u8 {
+    return &struct {
+        const value: [12 + bytes.len]u8 = blk: {
+            var buf: [12 + bytes.len]u8 = undefined;
+            buf[0 .. 4 + bytes.len].* = sliceInput(bytes).*;
+            std.mem.writeInt(u64, buf[4 + bytes.len ..][0..8], int, .little);
+            break :blk buf;
+        };
+    }.value;
+}
+
+/// Every seed, in the byte stream `Smith` reads. All three targets take the
+/// same corpus: each starts with one slice, and the two that read a trailing
+/// integer fall back to the low end of its range when an entry has none.
+pub const inputs = [_][]const u8{
+    sliceInput(query),
+    sliceInput(response),
+    sliceInput(all_sections),
+    sliceInput(opt_do_bit),
+    sliceInput(opt_ecs),
+    sliceInput(pointer_loop),
+    sliceInput(forward_pointer),
+    sliceInput(reserved_label),
+    sliceInput(rdlength_overrun),
+    sliceInput(count_too_large),
+    sliceInput(header_only),
+    // The compressed response, read from the offset of each compressed owner
+    // name rather than from zero.
+    sliceIntInput(response, 29),
+    sliceIntInput(response, 47),
+    sliceIntInput(chain_at_cap, chainTopOffset(max_jumps)),
+    sliceIntInput(chain_past_cap, chainTopOffset(max_jumps + 1)),
+    // A response aged past every TTL it carries.
+    sliceIntInput(response, 1_000_000),
+};
+
+test "the pointer chain has the documented shape" {
+    try std.testing.expectEqual(@as(usize, 3 + 2 * max_jumps), chain_at_cap.len);
+    try std.testing.expectEqual(@as(u64, 3 + 2 * (max_jumps - 1)), chainTopOffset(max_jumps));
+    // The topmost link points at the one below it.
+    try std.testing.expectEqual(
+        @as(u16, 0xc000 | (3 + 2 * (max_jumps - 2))),
+        std.mem.readInt(u16, chain_at_cap[chainTopOffset(max_jumps)..][0..2], .big),
+    );
+    // The lowest link points at the name itself.
+    try std.testing.expectEqual(@as(u16, 0xc000), std.mem.readInt(u16, chain_at_cap[3..5], .big));
+}
+
+test "a slice input carries its own length" {
+    const encoded = sliceInput(query);
+    try std.testing.expectEqual(@as(u32, query.len), std.mem.readInt(u32, encoded[0..4], .little));
+    try std.testing.expectEqualSlices(u8, query, encoded[4..]);
+}
diff --git a/tests/fuzz/dns_fuzz.zig b/tests/fuzz/dns_fuzz.zig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af66784
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/fuzz/dns_fuzz.zig
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+//! Fuzz targets for the DNS wire-format core (`src/dns/`).
+//!
+//! Every target holds the same contract: rejecting attacker bytes with an
+//! error is correct, panicking, overflowing or reading out of bounds is not.
+//! Where a parse succeeds the target then checks the invariant the rest of the
+//! server is entitled to rely on:
+//!
+//!   - a `Packet` that `parse` accepted iterates cleanly in every section, and
+//!     its OPT record, option list and typed RDATA accessors cannot panic;
+//!   - a `Name` that `parse` accepted ends inside the packet and survives a
+//!     round trip through presentation form;
+//!   - a buffer that `decrementTtls` aged still parses, and no record it aged
+//!     holds a TTL below the minimum it reported.
+//!
+//! The targets stay inside the documented safe entry points. `setId` is called
+//! only on a buffer long enough to hold a header, because it asserts that
+//! length rather than returning an error. `ResponseBuilder` is absent: its
+//! assertions guard programmer error, not attacker input, so tripping them
+//! would report a fuzz finding that no packet can cause.
+//!
+//! Runner semantics: under a plain `zig build test` each target runs once per
+//! corpus entry plus once on empty input, which makes the corpus a regression
+//! suite. `zig build test --fuzz=<n>` gives each target `n` generated inputs;
+//! the limit counts iterations, not seconds.
+
+const std = @import("std");
+const dns = @import("dns");
+const corpus = @import("corpus.zig");
+
+const packet = dns.packet;
+const name = dns.name;
+const record = dns.record;
+const edns = dns.edns;
+const types = dns.types;
+const Smith = std.testing.Smith;
+
+/// Inputs are capped well under the 65535-byte protocol maximum. The parsers
+/// are length-driven — every bound comes from a count, an RDLENGTH or the
+/// slice end — so a longer buffer adds iterations, not code paths, and a
+/// smaller one buys more executions per second.
+const max_input = 4096;
+
+const fuzz_options: std.testing.FuzzInputOptions = .{ .corpus = &corpus.inputs };
+
+test "fuzz packet.parse" {
+    try std.testing.fuzz({}, parseTarget, fuzz_options);
+}
+
+test "fuzz name.parse" {
+    try std.testing.fuzz({}, nameTarget, fuzz_options);
+}
+
+test "fuzz packet.decrementTtls" {
+    try std.testing.fuzz({}, ttlTarget, fuzz_options);
+}
+
+fn parseTarget(_: void, smith: *Smith) anyerror!void {
+    var buf: [max_input]u8 = undefined;
+    const bytes = buf[0..smith.slice(&buf)];
+
+    const p = packet.parse(bytes) catch return;
+
+    var questions = packet.questions(p);
+    while (try questions.next()) |_| {}
+
+    for ([_]packet.RecordIterator{
+        packet.answers(p),
+        packet.authorities(p),
+        packet.additionals(p),
+    }) |section| {
+        var records = section;
+        while (try records.next()) |rec| sweepRdata(bytes, rec);
+    }
+
+    _ = packet.firstQuestion(p);
+
+    const opt_record = packet.findOptRecord(p) orelse return;
+    // A non-OPT record cannot reach here, so `NotOpt` is impossible; a
+    // malformed option list is not, and is a legitimate rejection.
+    const opt = edns.parseOpt(bytes, opt_record) catch return;
+
+    // `parseOpt` validates the whole option list, so an `OptRecord` it
+    // returned must iterate to the end without error.
+    var options = edns.options(bytes, opt);
+    while (try options.next()) |option| {
+        if (option.code == edns.ecs_option_code) ignore(edns.parseEcs(option.data));
+    }
+    ignore(edns.findOption(bytes, opt, edns.ecs_option_code));
+}
+
+fn nameTarget(_: void, smith: *Smith) anyerror!void {
+    var buf: [max_input]u8 = undefined;
+    const bytes = buf[0..smith.slice(&buf)];
+    const offset = smith.valueRangeAtMost(u32, 0, @intCast(bytes.len));
+
+    const parsed = name.parse(bytes, offset) catch return;
+
+    try std.testing.expect(parsed.end <= bytes.len);
+    try std.testing.expect(parsed.name.len >= 1);
+    try std.testing.expect(parsed.name.len <= types.max_name_len);
+    try std.testing.expectEqual(@as(u8, 0), parsed.name.bytes[parsed.name.len - 1]);
+
+    try expectTextRoundTrip(parsed.name);
+}
+
+fn ttlTarget(_: void, smith: *Smith) anyerror!void {
+    var buf: [max_input]u8 = undefined;
+    const bytes = buf[0..smith.slice(&buf)];
+    const elapsed = smith.value(u32);
+
+    if (bytes.len >= types.header_len) {
+        packet.setId(bytes, @truncate(elapsed));
+        try std.testing.expectEqual(
+            @as(u16, @truncate(elapsed)),
+            std.mem.readInt(u16, bytes[0..2], .big),
+        );
+    }
+
+    const minimum = packet.decrementTtls(bytes, elapsed) catch return;
+
+    // Aging rewrites TTL words in place and nothing else, so a buffer that
+    // aged cleanly is still structurally valid.
+    const p = try packet.parse(bytes);
+    const reported = minimum orelse return;
+
+    for ([_]packet.RecordIterator{
+        packet.answers(p),
+        packet.authorities(p),
+        packet.additionals(p),
+    }) |section| {
+        var records = section;
+        while (try records.next()) |rec| {
+            if (rec.rtype == .opt) continue;
+            try std.testing.expect(rec.ttl >= reported);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Runs every typed RDATA accessor over a record. Each one rejects a record of
+/// the wrong type or a truncated RDATA, so only a panic is a finding here.
+fn sweepRdata(bytes: []const u8, rec: record.Record) void {
+    ignore(record.rdataA(bytes, rec));
+    ignore(record.rdataAaaa(bytes, rec));
+    ignore(record.rdataCname(bytes, rec));
+    ignore(record.rdataSoaMinimumTtl(bytes, rec));
+    std.mem.doNotOptimizeAway(rec.rdata.slice(bytes));
+}
+
+fn ignore(result: anytype) void {
+    if (result) |value| std.mem.doNotOptimizeAway(value) else |_| {}
+}
+
+/// Presentation form is lossy for labels holding a dot: `formatText` joins
+/// labels with dots and `fromText` splits on them, so "a.b" as one label and
+/// as two labels write the same text. Wire parsing accepts either, so the
+/// round trip is only a property of names that carry no dot inside a label.
+fn expectTextRoundTrip(n: name.Name) !void {
+    var i: usize = 0;
+    while (i < n.len and n.bytes[i] != 0) {
+        const label_len = n.bytes[i];
+        if (std.mem.findScalar(u8, n.bytes[i + 1 ..][0..label_len], '.') != null) return;
+        i += 1 + @as(usize, label_len);
+    }
+
+    // Presentation form replaces each length byte with a separating dot and
+    // drops the terminating zero, so it never exceeds the wire length.
+    var text_buf: [types.max_name_len]u8 = undefined;
+    var w: std.Io.Writer = .fixed(&text_buf);
+    try name.formatText(n, &w);
+
+    const round_tripped = try name.fromText(w.buffered());
+    try std.testing.expectEqualSlices(u8, n.wire(), round_tripped.wire());
+}